Prior to the 1975 amendments (0. Reg. 1o6/75) to the Rules of Practice, rules 25 and 26 provided for service out of the jurisdiction on an ex parte application. The plaintiff had to verify in the affidavit supporting the application that he had a good and arguable case. Since the amendments, rule 25 only is retained and confers an absolute right to effect service out of the jurisdiction without a prior court order in the instances specified in the rule. The discretion of the court formerly exercised under rule 26 to make or not to make the order for service has not been carried into the amended rule 29 which allows a defendant to move to set aside the service. Accordingly, a defendant can only succeed under that rule if he can show that the plaintiff's claim does not fall within the cases set out in rule 25, and he cannot require that the plaintiff file an affidavit verifying his statement of claim. The non-payment by a defendant in Quebec under a contract for the sale of goods under which payment was to be made in Quebec may still constitute "damage sustained in Ontario arising from ... a breach of contract committed elsewhere" where plaintiff is a very large Canadian company with national business activities and has its head office in Ontario. The whole company suffers by virtue of the non-payment, and a part of that company, including the head office, being in Ontario, the case is a proper one for service ex juris.
Jurisdiction -Service ex juris -Forum non Conveniens -Alberta Court of Appeal Talbot v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (1977) , 3 Alta L.R. (2d) 354- In order to obtain an order for service ex juris the plaintiff should show that he has a reasonable or good arguable case against the defendant of a nature within those specified in the appropriate rule of court. If he does the court will then consider whether an order should be refused. In the present case the order for service ex juris was granted against a parent company whose wholly owned subsidiary was resident in the province and where the interaction between the parent and the subsidiary was a foundation of the plaintiff's claim. The amendments to the rules relating to service ex juris permitting the plaintiff to effect such service without prior order of the court do not alter the existence or nature of the discretion of the court to set aside such service on the basis that is not the forum conveniens. In a negligence action in which the plaintiff suffered damage in Ontario as a result of a sequence of events which entirely occurred within the province of Quebec and from which same events four separate actions had already been instituted in Quebec, the service ex juris ought to be set aside. The forum conveniens for this case was Quebec rather than Ontario since: (i) virtually the entire sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's damage occurred in Quebec; (ii) a con-sideration of the laws of Quebec and in particular Quebec statutes relative to the rights and liabilities of Quebec Hydro would be required at trial; (iii) multiplicity of trials concerning the same subject matter could be avoided by trial in Quebec in view of the four other pending actions there concerning the same occurrence; (iv) the defendants should not be vexed with having to defend simultaneously an Ontario action by the plaintiff and a Quebec action by the plaintiff's insurer; and (v) there would be no substantial expense or inconvenience to the plaintiff in requiring travel from Ottawa to Quebec for trial. The expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in Ontario were not "damage sustained" in Ontario arising from a tort committed elsewhere within the meaning of rule 25 (I) (h) but merely items to be brought into account in assessing the amount of damage sustained in Saskatchewan, and the case was therefore not one for service ex juris. The applicant, Westinghouse, was a defendant in two actions brought by public utility companies in state and federal courts in the United States for breach of contract for failure to supply uranium. The defence pleaded in those actions was that the applicant's obligations had been rendered "commercially impracticable" within the meaning of s. 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the grounds, inter alia, that the price of uranium had been artificially increased as a result of anti-competitive actions of certain foreign governments and producers. The applicant had on the same day it applied for the letters rogatory, launched its own action in the United States against a number of uranium producers, including those alleged to be parties to the anti-competitive arrangements pleaded in defence to the other action, alleging conspiracy in violation of American anti-trust laws and claiming damages. The letters rogatory, issued in the federal court action, were directed to elicit testimony and documents to support the defence of anti-competitive activities which were alleged to have raised the price of uranium. The witnesses included a representative of the Government of Canada. The Attorney-General of Canada intervened and filed an affidavit of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources which set out the background to "an informal marketing arrangement among non-U.S. producers" of uranium and indicating that action had been taken to "stabilize ... the uranium marketing situation," details of which "it would not be in the public interest to disclose." The Minister's affidavit also claimed Crown privilege in respect of the documents listed in the letters rogatory.
The application to enforce the letters rogatory was dismissed by the court on the ground that it will exercise its discretion to enforce letters rogatory only if it is clear that what is intended is the taking of evidence for the purpose of trial and not merely of discovery, and that the evidence is absolutely necessary to the requesting court for the purposes of doing justice. The court is entitled to go behind the letters rogatory, and in the present case the transcripts of the proceeding leading to the issuance of the letters rogatory indicated that no such determination had been made by the American court. It was evident that the letters rogatory had been granted pursuant to the broad discovery rules existing in the United States and that there had been no determination that the evidence was necessary for the purposes of the trial.
It was apparent that the principle reason this application was pursued was not for use in the action itself, as documents had been produced in the American federal court to establish the defence pleaded, but to gather evidence in support of the applicant's claim in its own action in which the companies represented by the witnesses were themselves parties.
The enforcement of letters rogatory is based upon international comity or courtesy, and comity will not be exercised in violation of the public policy of the state to which the request is made. As a Minister of the Crown had deposed that the Government of Canada had, as a matter of public policy, taken the position that the information sought should not be disclosed, the Ontario courts should give effect to this policy. Moreover, it would be inappropriate to invoke the principle of comity to assist a foreign tribunal to determine whether the actions of the Government of Canada were contrary to or inconsistent with the lex fori.
The Uranium Information Security Regulations, P.C. 1976-2368, SOR/76-6 4 4 , promulgated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-ig, provided a complete answer to the application. The regulations, which make it an offence to disclose documents or material relating to the uranium pricing arrangements, are intra vires as falling within the general power extended by s. 9(g) of the Act to enact regulations deemed "necessary for carrying out any of the provisions or purposes of the Act." The purpose of the Act is to provide for the control of the production of atomic energy and as the question of whether these regulations were necessary is a subjective one, the court will not question the decision of the regulationmaking authority unless bad faith is established. ) either the petitioner or the respondent has been ordinarily resident in that province for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and has actually resided in that province for at least ten months of that period." In determining where the petitioner was ordinarily resident in the year preceding the filing of the petition the court must ask where the petitioner regularly, normally, or customarily lived in that year. Thus, the arrival of a person in a new locality with the intention of making a home in that locality for an indefinite period makes that person ordinarily resident in that community.
A petitioner must also comply with the second jurisdictional requirement of s. 5( ) (b) in that he or she must actually reside "in that province for at least ten months of that period." Since the only period referred to is "a period of at least one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition," the required period of actual residence is at least i o months of the period of ordinary residence and not io months of the period of ordinary residence which is within one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
With respect to the period of "actual residence", this decision overrules Hardy v. Hardy, [1969] v. Indyka, [1969] A.C. 33, which enlarged the principles upon which a foreign divorce decree would be recognized, had become part of the common law at the time of the passing of the Divorce Act. As a result of that decision the court can recognize a foreign decree not only on the basis of domicile but also whenever a real and substantial connection is shown between the petitioner or the respondent and the country or territory exercising jurisdiction. Where a husband obtains a Hungarian divorce after living 20 years in Canada and after having become a Canadian citizen with no return by the husband or wife to Hungary during those 20 years there is no real and substantial connection between the husband and Hungary at the time of the divorce. The fact that the husband, born in Hungary, had to leave the country for political reasons is not sufficient. Moreover, the fact that the husband was contemplating marrying a woman in Hungary and that Hungarian law would not recognize a divorce granted to the husband by any other jurisdiction does not establish a real and substantial connection. Finally, the fact that by Hungarian law the husband is a Hungarian citizen does not assist him in establishing such a connection. The validity of a foreign divorce before Canadian courts does not depend on the nationality or residence of the parties nor on the country where the marriage was solemnized, but on whether it was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction. When determining whether the decree was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction regard must be had to the domicile of the husband at the time of the decree. However, if the husband had a real and substantial connec-tion with the jurisdiction of the court that granted the decree, the decree will be recognized. Thus, where a husband obtained a decree from a court in West Germany, and where he was a resident of that country with little or no chance at all to leave it immediately during the post-war period because he was a stateless person and a refugee from concentration camps, the husband was held to have had a real and substantial connection with West Germany and the decree was recognized.
Custody -Jurisdiction -General Principles -Ontario High Court Where two courts in different provinces have jurisdiction over the child, the court which should decide the question of interim custody pending trial must be determined, firstly, according to the welfare of the child, and, secondly, having regard to the fair and proper administration of justice. (3) Where infants are brought into the jurisdiction from their ordinary residence to evade process about to issue or contrary to the terms of a custody order in another jurisdiction, generally speaking, such conduct does not receive the condonation of the court. It has been regarded as an improper interference in the discharge of a function so responsible and delicate; thus the courts have made orders directing that the infants be taken back to the jurisdiction from whence they were taken. (4) The father in the present case could not be said to be a "quasi-kidnapper" as the children had been brought to Ontario with the consent of the mother and a British Columbia ex parte order was not in existence at that time. (5) The ordinary residence of the children was British Columbia. While the mother had surreptitiously removed them from Ontario, the father had delayed in bringing proceedings for their return and should be taken to have acquiesced in their removal. (6) The evidence before the court was not sufficient to warrant an inference of a reasonable apprehension of serious harm to the children if they were returned to British Columbia. The court, as parens patriae, has an inherent jurisdiction over resident infants which is not diminished by s. i i ( i ) (c) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, permitting a court to make an order for custody of children on granting a divorce. That provision deals only with the rights of the parents between themselves. Consequently, an award of custody of a child to one parent by an Ontario court under that provision does not entitle that parent to assert an absolute right to custody of the child against a third person in Newfoundland. It is for the Newfoundland court to determine whether or not it is in the best interests of the child to remain in Newfoundland.
Only the court of the province which made the order for corollary relief can vary it, but the province where the child resides has jurisdiction to hear and determine custody anew. Section ii (2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, provides that an order made pursuant to s. i may be varied from time to time or rescinded by the court that made the order if it thinks it fit and just to do so. That section limits the power of variation or rescission of a maintenance order made under s. i i to the court that made the original order. There is no jurisdiction in a superior court in Ontario, either at common law or under s. 2 of the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, to vary an order for maintenance made by a foreign court. Parliament, in order to implement effectively its legislative jurisdiction over divorce, granted to the court that had made the original order for corollary relief the power to vary or rescind such order at any time including after the granting of the judgment absolute. Parliament had the power so to do and it could not be said to have trenched upon provincial jurisdiction simply because it has not seen fit to confer jurisdiction on any court other than the one that made the original order.
However, the parens patriae jurisdiction of the superior court over the custody of infants within its territorial jurisdiction is not ousted by an order for custody made by way of corollary relief under s. i, (2) of the Divorce Act.
Section i1 (2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, provides that an order for maintenance may be varied or rescinded "by the court that made the order if it thinks it fit and just to do so.... ." There is no power in a court in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the original order for maintenance was made to vary or rescind the order for maintenance. The only exception to this rule is where the order provides for maintenance for children and the children are resident in the jurisdiction of the court which did not grant the original order. In that case the court, because of its inherent jurisdiction, has power to vary the children's maintenance. There is no inherent jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Ontario to vary a maintenance order made by a foreign court. Furthermore, Parliament did not intend by the enactment of the Divorce Act to confer that power upon superior courts in Canada in divorce proceedings. Accordingly the only court which can vary or rescind the original order for maintenance made by the British Columbia Supreme Court is that court. , provides that once a final foreign maintenance order is registered in an Ontario court "all proceedings may be taken thereon as if it had been an order originally obtained in the court in which it was so registered and that court has power to enforce the order," there is no jurisdiction in the Ontario court to vary the said order. There is, however, jurisdiction to enforce it. The same view is followed in British Columbia. Section 30(i) of the Family Relations Act, S.B.C. 1972, c. 20, which gives the court power to vary orders, applies only to orders involving resident parties before the court. Further, to decline to enforce the order is also to vary the order and therefore beyond the court's jurisdiction. See British Columbia Supreme Court in Chambers: Re Enright and
There is no jurisdiction under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, S.S. 1968, c. 59, for the court, when dealing with a registered order, to vary, modify, or discharge such an order. The authority to do so remains with the original court. A.G. for Alberta v. Allard, [1977] Where a maintenance order was made in British Columbia against a husband residing in Saskatchewan and the wife later resumed cohabitation with her husband in Saskatchewan, jurisdiction existed in the court in Saskatchewan to deal with an application under s. 7 of the Act for "confirmation" of the order from British Columbia. Proceedings were initiated in British Columbia but no operative order came into existence. The fact of resumption of cohabitation did not prevent the court in Saskatchewan from hearing evidence and making its own original order.
Alberta Supreme Court
gambling party, paid his gambling debts by a cheque that was subsequently dishonoured. The plaintiff, having made good the amount of the dishonoured cheque, called on the defendant for repayment. The defendant procured a note and subsequently a mortgage which the plaintiff accepted as collateral security for the defendant's obligation to repay. After some unsuccessful attempts to recover on these securities the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, who relied on the Gaming Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 187. By s. i every agreement for reimbursing or repaying any money knowingly lent for gaming shall be deemed to have been made for an illegal consideration. By s. 4 every contract by way of gaining or wagering is void, and by s. 5 "any promise, express or implied, to pay any person a sum of money paid by him under or in respect of a contract or agreement rendered void by s. 4 . . . is void.. .. "
The trial judge had held that s. 5 only applied to "contracts rendered void by S. 4," that s. 4 only made void gaming contracts in Ontario, and consequently that a promise in Ontario to repay money paid in respect of a legal gaming contract made abroad was enforceable. This was confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal which held that ss. 4 and 5 did not apply and that the transaction did not fall within s. i, which only applies to money lent for future gaming, not to an agreement to repay money lent to pay past gaming debts. Section 25(I) of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5 , defining an inland bill as a bill drawn within Canada on a person resident therein, does not include a bill of exchange drawn on a foreign agency of a Canadian bank. A bank carrying on business in a foreign country is "resident" in that country for the purpose of cheques drawn on its foreign agency.
Bills and Notes
By s. 16i of the Bills of Exchange Act, the interpretation of the endorsement of a bill drawn in one country and negotiated in another is determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. Thus, where bills drawn in Canada were fraudulently endorsed in New York and the question arose whether Canadian or New York law applied, the court held that whether or not s. 161 extended to the legal effect of an endorsement, New York law would apply to the case, since the cheques were payable there, and were endorsed, negotiated, and paid there. 
Sale of Goods
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c. 143, where liability arises out of the use of a motor vehicle in any province or territory in Canada "the insurer shall not set up any defence to a claim that might not be set up if the policy were a motor vehicle liability policy issued in the province or territory." Under the Saskatchewan standard insurance policy the definition of automobile included a replacement automobile, but not, as under the comparable Alberta clause, an additional automobile. In an action to determine the liability of the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office in a case where a Saskatchewan insured purchased an additional automobile, and liability arose from its use in Alberta, the court held that the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office was liable by the operation of s. The principle of comity of nations requires that Ontario courts recognize the appointment by a competent authority of a receiver in a foreign jurisdiction. Where under the laws of that jurisdiction and under Ontario law the appointment crystallizes a floating charge on the assets of a judgment debtor, the assignment by way of charge to the receiver will be recognized by the Ontario courts and it takes precedence over the rights of a judgment creditor which has garnished all debts owing by the garnishee to the judgment debtor.
Bankruptcy -Petition for Receiving Order -Affidavit of Verification Sworn Outside Canada -Ontario Supreme Court in Bankruptcy Re Legault (1 9 77), 2 4 C.B.R. (N.S.) 83.
An affidavit sworn before a foreign attorney at law is not admissible in Ontario. An affidavit sworn before a foreign notary is not admissible in Ontario unless, in addition to the designation of his office, his seal is also affixed or impressed on the document. However, a commissioner who notes his office below his signature may take an affidavit outside Ontario, and such affidavit would be admissible in Ontario without further proof. 
